Chapter 1: Introduction
Outline of the problems relating to epistemic possibility
and conditionals. Background material.
Chapter 2: Epistemic Modals
We argue against the relativistic semantics
and argue for an impossible worlds account instead. In particular, we offer a
two-dimensional account of epistemic possibility ascriptions of the
form ‘for all s knows, p might be the case’. At the end of the chapter
we show how to extend the account to bare ‘might’ ascriptions. We
conclude with some arguments against assessment-sensitive accounts of epistemic possibility.
Chapter 3: Subjunctive Conditionals
The chapter is a discussion of subjunctives in context. It evaluates what we take to be a contextual fallacy in the standard understanding of the logic of subjunctive conditionals.
[*Based on our "Counterfactuals and Context" Analysis, forthcoming 2008]
Chapter 4: Subjunctive Counterpossibles
Our epistemic possible worlds account. On David Lewis’ theory of subjunctives conditionals, subjunctives with impossible antecedents are familiarly treated as vacuously true. But as Daniel Nolan and others have argued, there are several good reasons to steer clear of a vacuity treatment. In this chapter we provide further reasons in support of a non-trivial account of counterpossibles. We then raise problems for various treatments (including Nolan's) of counterpossibles and argue that the problem requires for its solution a theory of subjunctives that accounts for the opacity of counterpossible subjunctives. We conclude by offering an alternative semantics for counterpossibles.
[*Based on our "Remarks on Counterpossibles" in Johan van Benthem, Vincent F. Hendricks, John Symons and Stig Andur Pedersen (eds.) Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy, Synthese Library, forthcoming 2008.]
Chapter 5: Indicative counterpossibles
The epistemic account. Includes cool stuff about comparative clauses. The paradoxes of material implication suggest something wrong with the material conditional interpretation of indicative conditionals in ordinary language. Some argue that indicative conditionals should be given a possible world treatment, analogous to the standard treatment of subjunctive conditionals. However, special problems arise for indicative conditionals with necessarily false antecedents--- namely, those very problems that arise for counterpossible subjunctives. Then we argue that indicative conditionals are to be given the treatment developed in chapter 4. Since it is controversial to treat subjunctive and indicative conditionals in the same way, the second half of the paper is devoted to providing replies to objections to a uniform treatment of subjunctive and indicative conditionals and in particular to the treatment offered here.
